On November 27, Syrian rebels launched an offensive against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It ended on December 8 with the capture of Damascus and the overthrow of the regime. This event exposed the weakness of the Syrian army: the regime's air force suffered a defeat, and the ground forces effectively fell apart, writes The Telegraph.
The rapid advance of the opposition also highlighted Russia's underestimated problems. Although Russian troops supported the Assad regime, they did not actively intervene as the opposition captured towns after towns. For Russian leader Vladimir Putin, this was not a choice - he relied on the Wagner Group, a private military company that has become Moscow's main ground force in Syria. However, the dependence on mercenaries doomed both the group and the Syrian regime.
This is a lesson for all governments: mercenaries are not a reliable instrument of state policy. The Wagner Group, created in 2014 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, rose to prominence after the annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria. Its irregular forces allowed Moscow to avoid direct responsibility for its actions. But motivated by profit, the Wagnerites demanded a share of Syria's oil revenues in exchange for saving the Assad regime. This strengthened the owner of the PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, but sowed internal conflicts.
In 2023, as Russia's war in Ukraine escalated, the Wagner Group took part in the fighting. The mercenaries won a Pyrrhic victory in Bakhmut, but this led to heavy losses and discontent. In June 2023, the mercenaries rebelled, occupied Rostov-on-Don and moved on Moscow. Putin granted them amnesty, but Prigozhin was soon killed in a plane crash, effectively eliminating the group.
With the Assad regime under threat again and the Russian army bogged down in Ukraine, Moscow’s commercial force of intervention was in disarray. After all, any state that relies on mercenaries, as Russia did between 2014 and 2023, risks failure.